Abstract Transparency is intimately linked to debates about the ethics, political legitimacy and effectiveness of nudging. This paper provides an overview of empirical studies investigating how changes in the transparency of a nudge affect people's choices and evaluations of the nudge. I conclude that the present literature provides generally consistent evidence supporting that the effectiveness of a nudge does not decrease when choosers are given good opportunity to detect and understand the influence it might have on their choices. However, several conceptual and methodological issues are identified, significantly limiting the scope of the conclusions that can be drawn. The limitations are discussed and organized into six themes, with recommendations provided for how future research may address them.
All over the world, private and public institutions have been attracted to "nudges," understood as interventions that preserve freedom of choice, but that steer people in particular directions. The most effective nudges are often "defaults," which establish what happens if people do nothing. For example, automatic enrollment in savings plans is a default nudge, as is automatic enrollment in green energy. Default rules are in widespread use, but we have very little information about how people experience them, whether they see themselves as manipulated by them, and whether they approve of them in practice. In this book, Patrik Michaelsen and Cass R. Sunstein offer a wealth of new evidence about peoples experiences and perceptions with respect to default rules. They argue that this evidence can help us to answer important questions about the effectiveness and ethics of nudging. The evidence offers a generally positive picture of how default nudges are perceived and experienced. The central conclusion is simple: empirical findings strongly support the conclusion that, taken as such, default nudges are both ethical and effective. These findings, and the accompanying discussion, have significant implications for policymakers in many nations, and also for the private sector. Patrik Michaelsen is a Researcher at the University of Gothenburg, Sweden. He holds a Ph. D. in Psychology from the Department of Psychology, University of Gothenburg. Cass R. Sunstein is the Robert Walmsley University Professor at Harvard University, USA. From 2009 to 2012, he was Administrator of the White House Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs, and since that time, he has held several positions in the U.S Government. From 2020 to 2022, he was the Chair of the Technical Advisory Group on Behavioral Insights and Sciences for Health at the World Health Organization. He is the founder and director of the Program on Behavioral Economics and Public Policy at Harvard Law School. Sunstein has written numerous books, including Human Agency and Behavioral Economics: Nudging Fast and Slow (Palgrave, 2017); Why Nudge?: The Politics of Libertarian Paternalism (2014); and Nudge: Improving Decisions About Health, Wealth, and Happiness (with Richard H. Thaler, 2008).
Intro -- Preface -- Acknowledgments -- Contents -- List of Figures -- List of Tables -- 1 The Problem -- Default Nudges -- References -- 2 Challenges for Nudging and a Framework for Assessing Them -- Effectiveness -- Ethical Issues -- What Is the Problem? -- Unacceptable Paternalism -- Manipulation -- Responses to Criticisms -- People's Perceptions and Experiences of Nudges: A Framework -- Proposition 1: People's Perceptions and Experiences Are Part of the Net (Welfare) Effect of the Nudge -- Proposition 2: People's Perceptions and Experiences Are Relevant to the Ethical Assessment of Nudges -- Proposition 3: People's Perceptions and Experiences Can Moderate Behavior Change -- The Relevance of Transparency -- References -- 3 How Do People Evaluate Default Nudges? -- Survey-Based Research -- Transparency and Defaults -- Transparency and Choice -- Transparency and Perceptions of Default Nudges -- Firsthand Evaluations -- Choice Experiences: Do Defaults Affect Experienced Autonomy and Choice Satisfaction? -- Perceptions of Defaults and Choice Architects Using Them -- What We Know -- References -- 4 Evaluation -- Distribution -- Measuring Welfare -- Lessons -- References -- References -- Index.
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AbstractCriticisms of nudging suggest that nudges infringe on decision makers' autonomy. Yet, little empirical research has explored whether people who are subjected to nudges agree. In three between-group experiments (N = 2083), we subject participants to contrasting choice architectures and measure experiences of autonomy, choice-satisfaction, perceived threat to freedom of choice, and objection to the choice architecture. Participants who received a prosocial opt-out default nudge made more prosocial choices but did not report lower autonomy or choice satisfaction than participants in opt-in default or active-choice conditions. This was the case even when the presence of the nudge was disclosed, and when monetary choice stakes were introduced. With monetary choice stakes, participants perceived the threat to freedom of choice as slightly higher in the nudge condition than in the other conditions, but objection to the choice architecture did not differ between the conditions. Taken together, our results suggest that default nudges are less manipulative and autonomy-infringing than sometimes feared. We recommend that policymakers include measures of choice experiences when testing out new interventions.